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Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency - an Actor in National
Security?
Abstract
One disparate feature between Finnish civilian and military intelligence is their express
relationship to national security. The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service prominently
declares to be an expert in national security whereas no corresponding public territorial
claim has been made by its counterpart – the Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency (FDIA).
This observation leads to the question: are the tasks of the FDIA limited solely to the
military defence of Finland or has it any more comprehensive role in safeguarding national
security. This article aims to examine this question by comparing the provisions governing
the purpose of civilian and military intelligence and analysing the provision on the targets
of military intelligence. Legal analysis indicate that military intelligence targets are broadly
located in the field on national security, both at the core of military activities and in the
outer reaches on non-military activities. The FDIA actually has a wide mandate which
extends its mission beyond the reaches of civilian intelligence.
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Introduction
The Civilian and Military Intelligence Acts entered into force in Finland
on 1 June 2019, in other words at a time when a century had passed
since the emergence of independent Finnish military intelligence and
70 years after the establishment of the Finnish Security Police,
nowadays known as the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service
(FSIS).1 With the FSIS and the Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency
(FDIA) securing new statutory powers to acquire and use information
on both domestic and international threats to Finland’s national
defence and security, these public authorities have been transformed
into combined domestic security and foreign intelligence services. They
are empowered to discharge their functions using a range of 24
statutory intelligence gathering methods together with certain
customary legal approaches.2 This represents a fundamental reform
that, along with a robust arsenal of intelligence gathering methods, will
inevitably change the mindset and behaviour of the Finnish intelligence
authorities.
There are more common than disparate features in Finnish civilian and
military intelligence. One disparate feature is their express relationship
to national security. The website of the FSIS prominently declares that
the organisation is an expert in national security.3 It is steered by a
National Security Unit that within the Ministry of the Interior.4 As
before the new intelligence legislation took effect, the FDIA continues
to state that it focuses on the strategic military conditions and on the
military situation in the near abroad.5 The National Defence Unit in the
Ministry of Defence is responsible for steering and co-ordinating
military intelligence.6 This raises the question of whether the actorness
of the FDIA is limited solely to the military defence of Finland, or
whether it has any more comprehensive role in protecting national
security. This question will be examined by comparing the provisions
governing the purpose of civilian and military intelligence, and
analyzing the provision governing the targets of military intelligence.
The conclusions drawn will be followed by a law recommendation to
harmonize the tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces with the purposes of
military intelligence.

The Purpose of Civilian and Military Intelligence
Section 1 of Chapter 5a of the Police Act defines civilian intelligence as
the gathering of information by the FSIS and the use of information to
1
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safeguard national security, to substantiate top-level government
decisions, and for other functions of public authorities related to
national security.7 The purpose of military intelligence is to obtain and
process information on military activities that target Finland or that are
relevant to the Finnish security environment, in order to substantiate
top-level government decisions and to discharge certain tasks of the
Finnish Defence Forces (section 3 of the Military Intelligence Act).8
Under the classic definition of scholar Sherman Kent, intelligence may
be analyzed into three elements: Information, the organisation that
processes it, and the practices of such an organisation.9 The foregoing
legal definitions of civilian and military intelligence in Finnish
intelligence legislation are consistent with the tripartite structure that
Kent suggested 70 years ago. These definitions expressly state the
parties that run intelligence and how and why they do so (see Table 1).
Table 1. Legal Definitions of Civilian and Military Intelligence
Who

Civilian
Intelligence

Military
Intelligence

How

Why

Finnish
Security and
Intelligence
Service, FSIS

By acquiring
and using
information

1) To safeguard national security
2) To substantiate top-level
government decisions
3) To support other public
authorities in discharging
functions related to national
security

Finnish
Defence
Intelligence
Agency,
FDIA

By acquiring
and
processing
information

1) To substantiate top-level
government decisions
2) To discharge certain tasks of the
Finnish Defence Forces

The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service is the only civilian
intelligence authority, whereas military intelligence is the sole preserve
of the FDIA. In other words, these are the sole authorities with the
functions and powers conferred by intelligence legislation. The Finnish
Security and Intelligence Service and Finnish Defence Intelligence
Agency discharge their intelligence functions by acquiring and using or
processing information. Though the terminology differs, the material
content is essentially the same: Depending on the stage of the
intelligence cycle, the intelligence authorities either collect, process or
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analyze information, or disseminate it to end-users. The primary role of
the intelligence authorities in countering threats is to observe them,
articulate them, and warn of them in advance. This makes the
intelligence authorities responsible for providing the intelligence that
other authorities require for their operations in response to those
threats.
The final question of why the FSIS and FDIA collect, process, analyze
and disseminate information may be approached by distinguishing
intrinsic and instrumental value in the aims of intelligence legislation.
Together with performing certain tasks of the Defence Forces, one
intrinsic aim and purpose of intelligence safeguarding national security
is to protect the fundamental interests of Finland. These interests are
essentially highly pressing when anchored in the foundations of polity
and fundamental rights, such as sovereignty of the republic and the
indivisibility of its territory, inviolability of legislative, governmental
and judicial powers and everyone’s right to life, personal liberty and
integrity (the Constitution of Finland).10
Substantiating policymaking by national leaders and supporting other
national security agencies may be regarded as instrumental objectives
of intelligence. They are instrumental in the sense that the support
function materially concerns disseminating information to intelligence
clients and partners, in other words an operation in which the
outcomes of intelligence missions to protect the key interests of
Finland are applied more extensively than within the intelligence
authorities. However, the support mission is just as valuable as the
other objectives prescribed in the legal definition of civilian and
military intelligence. There is only limited benefit to heightening
Finland’s preparedness and defence capability in response to a
deteriorating global and regional security situation if its political
leadership and national security agencies are characterised by
shortcomings due to slow or non-existent information sharing.11
Intelligence must also be examined as part of Finnish policy in general.
The goal of Finland’s foreign and security policy – and accordingly of
its intelligence functions – is to reinforce the international status of
Finland, to safeguard its independence and territorial integrity, to
improve the security and wellbeing of its people, to maintain the
functionality of society, and ultimately to avoid involvement in military
conflict.12 Credible intelligence can help to guide the behaviour of other
countries and at least discourage them from the most overt
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infringements of Finland’s fundamental interests. Senior Finnish
diplomat René Nyberg has observed that every country has intelligence
– either its own or that of foreign origin. Only a failed State gives full
rein to foreign intelligence within its borders.13 As a signal of
sovereignty, a domestic intelligence capacity accordingly serves to deter
any power planning to subvert government policymaking in Finland or
otherwise strike against the key interests of Finland or its people. An
uncodified but evident purpose of civilian and military intelligence
legislation is therefore to send such a signal and maintain deterrence
against adversaries both known and unknown.14
A comparison of the legal definitions of civilian and military
intelligence immediately indicates that only the top national leadership
and the Finnish Defence Forces are specified as participants in military
intelligence. In other words, the provision governing the purpose of
military intelligence suggests that the output of intelligence will be
disseminated solely to political policymakers and the military
leadership. So, does the Finnish military intelligence also serve
domestic and foreign partners outside of the intelligence cycle?
Naturally, it does – Finland’s principal interests are managed through
collaboration between the intelligence authorities and their clients and
partners. This collaboration requires a sharing of threat scenarios
within the intelligence community, and with relevant domestic public
authorities, businesses, and organisations. Finland must also bear
international responsibility for the national security of its politically
close countries. No country will be repeatedly willing to disclose
information that is essential for safeguarding Finland’s national
security if Finland fails to reciprocate for the benefit of its foreign
partners.15 Neither can the civilian and military intelligence authorities
ignore the legitimate needs of law enforcement authorities for
information disclosed in the course of intelligence concerning serious
offences that have already been committed or are still in progress. The
Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency has extensive statutory powers to
share information through both national and international cooperation. Besides intelligence clients, domestic and foreign
partnerships are of paramount importance in the work of Finnish
military intelligence.
Another noteworthy difference in the legal definitions of civilian and
military intelligence is that the provision governing the purpose of
military intelligence does not refer to national security at all. Is the
protection of national security in Finland a matter for civilian
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intelligence alone? To answer this question, one must shift focus to the
provision on the targets of military intelligence.

Targets of Military Intelligence
The limits governing protection of the secrecy of a confidential message
are prescribed in section 10.4 of the Constitution of Finland. The
intelligence reform that caused such upheaval in legislation began with
amendment of the said section 10.16 This provision permits the
enactment of necessary statutory limits on the secrecy of
communications for such purposes as obtaining information on
military activities or other corresponding activities that pose a serious
threat to national security. Section 10.4 of the Constitution has enabled
a disengagement from the requirement to base limits on an offence or
suspected offence and the enactment of targets of military intelligence
by ordinary law.17
The targets of military intelligence are prescribed in section 4 of the
Military Intelligence Act. Subsection 1 of this provision identifies seven
types of activity as a target of military intelligence, provided that the
activity is of military character. These military intelligence targets falls
within the military activities-related justification for limiting
communications secrecy prescribed in section 10.4 of the Constitution
of Finland.
In addition to these characteristically military types of activity, military
intelligence may also target activities that seriously threaten the
national defence of Finland and activities that seriously jeopardize the
vital functions of society. These non-military intelligence targets
referred to in section 4.2 of the Military Intelligence Act accordingly fall
under the national security-related justification for limiting
communications secrecy prescribed in section 10.4 of the Constitution.
However, these two intelligence targets lie beyond its core scope of
military activities (see Figure 1).18
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Figure 1. Targets of Military Intelligence from a Constitutional Viewpoint
1) The operation and operational preparation of foreign armed forces and equivalent organized forces

2) Intelligence operations targeting the national defence of Finland

Threats of a non-military character
3) The design, manufacture, distribution and
use of weapons of mass destruction

4) Development and distribution of
foreign military equipment

Threats of a
military character

5) A crisis that seriously jeopardizes
international peace and security

8) Activities that seriously threaten
the national defence of Finland

9) Activities that seriously jeopardize
the vital functions of society

6) An activity that seriously compromises the security of
international crisis management operations

7) An activity that seriously compromises the security of Finland’s international aid and other international operations
Source: Author.
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It should be noted by comparison that there are 11 targets of civilian
intelligence (section 3 of chapter 5a of the Police Act). The targets of
civilian intelligence, such as terrorism and intelligence operations of
foreign powers, in all respects concern non-military activities that
seriously threaten Finland’s national security. The demarcation
between military and non-military threats is however not clear in terms
of practical intelligence operations. For example, the Finnish Security
and Intelligence Service understand terrorism as a non-military activity
characterised by intimidation of people or coercion of the government,
whereas the Finnish Defence Forces and their associated intelligence
agency approach terrorism as a form of insurgent or revolutionary
warfare.19 Question about whether the target of information gathering
is a dual-use item (civilian intelligence target) or foreign military
equipment (military intelligence target) likewise testify to the complex
realities of intelligence that either adhere to or disregard normative
threat characterisations.
As Figure 1 illustrates, military intelligence targets are broadly located
in the field of national security, both at the core of military activities
and in the outer reaches of non-military activities. As Finnish military
intelligence enjoys predominant status at the core of national security,
it may be expected to seek to strengthen its position with respect to
non-military threats. There are two ways to do this: By giving military
intelligence targets 8–9 the broadest possible interpretation, or by
seeking the enactment of legislation on new non-military intelligence
targets. As explained below, the dynamic legal interpretation approach
goes a long way.
Activities that Seriously Threaten the National Defence of Finland
Finnish national defence encompasses ensuring territorial integrity, the
livelihoods and fundamental rights of the people, the practical options
of the national leadership, and the lawful social order.20 The primary
goal of national defence is to deter the use and threat of military force,
and to maintain the capacity to safeguard territorial integrity and repel
attacks. One primary threat to national defence is the use of military
force against Finland, which may result from military conflict arising in
the near-abroad or from crisis jeopardizing international peace and
security. For example, it is not realistic to expect Finland to remain
outside of any conflict or crisis arising in the Baltic Sea region.21
Military intelligence must evidently monitor Finland’s security
environment for such traditional threats over the long term and
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systematically, even before the monitored activity develops into a
military threat to Finland’s national security.
The threat to national defence referred to in section 4.2 of the Military
Intelligence Act also includes new types of threat, such as the Night
Wolves motorcycle club (Russki Mototsiklisty International) if this
were to become active in Finland. This gang has been operating chiefly
as a private military contractor on the Crimean peninsula, involved
alongside unmarked Russian military groups in such activities as
erecting roadblocks and invasion operations.22 A serious threat to
national defence may also be caused by such measures as cyberattacks
on the defence administration or against partners of the Finnish
Defence Forces. Cyberattacks are comparable to armed assaults in
terms of their impact and severity.23 A threat to national defence may
essentially strike at a very wide range of key interests, such as the
functional capacity and psychological resilience of the population, and
it is also open with regard to its causes and manifestations.
Activities that Seriously Jeopardize the Vital Functions of Society
The vital functions of society are operations that are essential for social
functioning and must be maintained under all circumstances. The
security strategy for society identifies seven such functions, of which
one is the economy, infrastructure, and security of supply.24 Threats
pertaining solely to this function include logistical obstructions,
interference in the financial system, power failures, and disruption of
communication and information systems.
Security of supply in Finland depends on logistics and international
contacts. Sea transport carries 90 per cent of Finland’s foreign trade
and 70 per cent of its imports. Disruptions in sea transport are
therefore immediately reflected in Finland’s economic and social
conditions, and in the system of transport logistics, that supports them.
Such disruptions could be caused by a change in international or
European security policy.25 A cyberattack on the financial market
infrastructure can paralyze payment transactions that are essential to a
functioning society and destabilise financial markets. Such severe and
unmanaged financial market malfunctions may escalate into economic
crises that threaten the entire national economy, for example through a
collapse in corporate and government creditworthiness.
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The functioning of Finland’s energy supply – particularly an
uninterrupted supply of electric power – is essential for ensuring the
vital functions of society. Supplies of oil, coal, gas, and nuclear fuel
depend entirely on imports. Two thirds of this energy originates
outside Finland, with two thirds of this imported segment coming from
Russia. For instance, even under normal conditions access to electric
power through international power cables may be subject to political
influence. Disruptions in distribution are generally a greater risk than
actual depletion of energy reserves.26
Most critical services in society rely on using electronic information
resources, data transmission, and the operation of communication
networks. These services are computer-controlled or electronic.
Information systems, and the communication networks that link them
together, are merging and networking into large and even global
entities, meaning that malfunctions easily spread to become systemic.
The gravity of this threat is underlined by the reliance on electric power
of the information and communication systems that guide society and
alert the public to disruptions or emergency conditions.
As these examples of threats to only one vital function in society
already indicate, the ninth and final threat serving as a basis for
military intelligence encompasses a wide range of non-military threats
to national security. Threats to society are dynamic and transformative,
whereas the process of de-securitization of phenomena or
developments that have already been identified as threats into normal
policy issues is a slow one. This means that the repertoire of nonmilitary threats to the vital functions of society is certainly not
diminishing.

Conclusions
The concept of national security did not become part of Finnish
legislation until an amendment to section 10 of the Constitution of
Finland came into force on 15 October 2018. This change paved the way
for enactment of the Civilian and Military Intelligence Acts on 1 June
2019. The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service that engages in
civilian intelligence work and the Ministry of the Interior, which guides
its performance, then hastened to announce their role as actors in
national security. No corresponding public territorial claim was made
by the FDIA or its administrative overseer at the Ministry of Defence.
May one conclude from this that the use of intelligence operations to
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safeguard national security has become the sole preserve of civilian
intelligence in Finland?
One may not. From a normative point of view, it is undisputed that the
FDIA has a central role to play in the production of national security
intelligence, and the provision governing the targets of military
intelligence actually extends this mission beyond the reaches of civilian
intelligence into core areas of national security in the form of threats of
military character.27 Besides these militarized threats, the FDIA has the
substantive competence to collect and process information on two nonmilitary threats: Activities that seriously threaten Finland’s national
defence and activities that seriously jeopardize the vital functions of
society. Safeguarding national security is accordingly a matter of
common concern between civilian and military intelligence in the case
of non-military threats, but falls within the sole purview of military
intelligence with respect to military threats.
The defence administration has by no means remained passive with
regard to the introduction of the concept of national security into
Finnish legislation in October 2018, and still less with respect to the
impact of this change on the Finnish Defence Forces. Indeed, the
research project finalized in May 2020 by the government has created a
knowledge base and prerequisites for the development of a
comprehensive impact assessment model from the perspective of
national security.28 The Ministry of Defence was responsible for the
project, and its steering group included representatives from the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Prime
Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the
Secretariat of the Security Committee.29 It is noteworthy that there was
no representative of the Ministry of the Interior on the steering group,
even though this is a security ministry by definition. It could be argued
that the turf war over national security began even before the ink of the
statute book had dried.
The stance of the defence administration and its military intelligence
arm towards national security may indeed be characterized as more
stealthy and research-driven than the corresponding relationship of
civilian intelligence. This stealth is simply due to the custom of not
openly communicating matters of military intelligence, whereas the
central role of research in turn recalls the esteem and organisation of
research in the defence administration.30 The Ministry of Defence has
an in-house research unit together with the Scientific Advisory Board
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for Defence, which is networked with universities and research
institutes. Other noteworthy institutions are the National Defence
University and the Finnish Defence Research Agency. These functions
and networks provide, if efficiently harnessed, considerable advantage
for military intelligence research and development.
The core tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces are prescribed in section 2
of the Act on the Defence Forces.31 This provision charges the Defence
Forces with responsibility for the military defence of Finland, for
supporting other public authorities, for rendering international
assistance, and for participating in international crisis management.
The general provision defining the mission of the Defence Forces was
not amended in the course of enacting the Military Intelligence Act.
According to Section 3 of the last-mentioned Act, military intelligence
may be used in the following tasks of the Defence Forces:
1. Surveillance of land and sea areas and airspace, and the
securing of territorial integrity,
2. Safeguarding the livelihoods and fundamental rights of the
people and the practical options available to the national
leadership, and defending the lawful social order,
3. Participating in assistance, regional co-operation or other
international aid-rendering and international activities based
on Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union or on Article 42(7) of the Treaty on
European Union,
4. Participating in international military crisis management
and military missions in other international crisis
management.
Military intelligence may accordingly be used in all core tasks of the
Finnish Defence Forces other than military training and supporting
other public authorities. Is it the case that the Defence Force related
tasks of military intelligence are wholly exhausted by the existing core
tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces? Is it furthermore true that military
intelligence plays no part in supporting other public authorities? By no
means. The fact that the independent military intelligence purposes
recognised under the Military Intelligence Act have not been integrated
into the general provision defining the mission of the Defence Forces
seems to be the result of either lack of legal comprehension or
willingness.
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One of the purposes of military intelligence is to collect and process
information on activities that seriously threaten Finland’s national
defence, or that seriously jeopardize vital functions of society.
Intelligence concerning threats targeting Finland’s national defence is
largely not a matter of surveilling land, sea, and airspace, nor is its
primary purpose to secure territorial integrity, but to substantiate the
policymaking of top national and military leaders. Safeguarding the
livelihoods and fundamental rights of the people, ensuring the practical
options of the national leadership, and defending the lawful social
order are essential, but they are not the only vital functions of society to
be considered in military intelligence. Other such functions include the
economy, infrastructure, and security of supply, and functional
capacity and psychological resilience of the population.32 These
purposes of military intelligence constitute a de facto extension of the
mandate of the Finnish Defence Forces pertaining to military defence
of Finland.
The Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency is required to collaborate with
both the FSIS and other public authorities in the proper discharge of
military intelligence, as provided in sections 17 and 18 of the Military
Intelligence Act. It is also empowered to engage in information sharing
and other international co-operation with foreign intelligence and
security services as stipulated in section 20 of the Military Intelligence
Act. It is thus straightforwardly incorrect to argue that military
intelligence does not play a role in supporting other public authorities,
both domestic and foreign. Hence, it would be appropriate to include
all the additions made to the purpose provision under the Military
Intelligence Act in the provision defining the core mission of the
Finnish Defence Forces. This would primarily be appropriate because
the Military Intelligence Act, with its broad powers and as a law
applicable both in normal conditions and during emergencies, is one of
the prime normative frameworks for the operations of the Finnish
Defence Forces.
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